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Richard A. Epstein’s The Classical Liberal Constitution is an imposing addition
to the burgeoning body of legal scholarship that seeks to “restore” a robust
conception of economic liberty and limited government to its rightful place at the
center of American constitutionalism. 1 Legislators and judges operating within a
“classical liberal conception of government,” Epstein explains, would approach
skeptically “[a]ll [regulatory] proposals that deviate from the basic common law
protections of life, liberty, and property.” 2 Classical liberal constitutional courts
would thus renounce the toothless rational basis review of the post-New Deal
*
Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. The author would like to thank
the editors of the Iowa Law Review and Professor Herbert Hovenkamp for the invitation to participate
in this exchange; and C.J. Peters and Kim Reilly for their thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this
essay.
1. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY
OF WE THE PEOPLE 23 (2016) (arguing that the Framers created a “republican” constitution that “views the
natural and inalienable rights of . . . joint and sovereign individuals [as] preceding the formation of
governments, so first comes rights and then comes government”); DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING
LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 3 (2011) (seeking to “rehabilitate” the
“liberty of contract doctrine” associated with Lochner v. New York, and arguing that that doctrine “was
grounded in precedent and the venerable natural rights tradition”); David E. Bernstein & Ilya Somin, The
Mainstreaming of Libertarian Constitutionalism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 43 (2014) (describing
approvingly a convergence in recent decades between “mainstream” and “libertarian,” or “classical
liberal,” constitutional thought).
2. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED
GOVERNMENT 98 (2014).
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“progressive mindset,” and instead subject to exacting scrutiny the government’s
“purported justifications both as to the ends [it] chooses and the means [it] uses to
achieve them.”3 Such a recalibration of constitutional scrutiny, Epstein predicts,
would “exert[] a profound,” and highly salutary, “effect on the size of
government.”4
Readers who share Epstein’s normative commitments naturally will find his
constitutional vision compelling. But The Classical Liberal Constitution is not merely
preaching to the choir; it is also addressed to those of us—constitutional
progressives and conservatives alike—who do not necessarily share the author’s
definition of individual liberty, faith in unregulated markets, or enthusiasm for
limited government. And this large and politically heterogeneous segment of
Epstein’s audience will just as naturally greet his constitutional vision with
suspicion that Epstein is, to paraphrase Justice Holmes, attempting to engraft upon
the Constitution a political and economic theory to which a majority of the country
does not subscribe.5
Epstein anticipates the charge and comes ready with an answer: The
argument for classical liberal constitutionalism does not proceed from liberal
political and economic theory (key premises of which, Epstein understands, many
readers do not embrace); nor does it depend on the Constitution’s text or the
original meaning of specific provisions (both of which, Epstein acknowledges, are
often ambiguous or indeterminate).6 Rather, Epstein stakes the cogency of his
vision to the authority of history. Indeed, the great ambition of The Classical Liberal
Constitution lies, in large part, in Epstein’s argument that the Constitution not only
can be read as a classical liberal document, but that it “was intended to embody
the theory of classical liberal thought.”7 The men who convened in Philadelphia in
the summer of 1787 were steeped in social contract and natural law theory, Epstein
contends, and designed a constitutional framework that reflected their worldview,
jealously protecting liberty and property against governmental encroachment. 8
This “classical view of American constitutionalism,” moreover, went on to enjoy “a
long historical run of about 150 years,” right up until the progressive “rewriting” of
the Constitution during the New Deal “revolution” of 1937.9 Fidelity to that

3. Id. at 310.
4. Id. at 311.
5. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of
deciding the case “upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain”).
6. See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 47 (noting that “many jurisdictional commands, such as those
under the Commerce Clause, and many substantive protections, such as those in the Bill of Rights, offer
what can only be termed open invitations to courts, and indeed everyone else, to flesh out the meaning
of the key terms”).
7. Id. at 582 (emphasis added).
8. Id. at 4–5, 18.
9. Id. at 34; see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION 76, 135 (2006).
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worldview and framework, in turn, requires courts to “examine[] all legal
interventions under a presumption of error.”10
Legal historians will find much to critique in Epstein’s appeal to history.
Herbert Hovenkamp, among other contributors to this forum, convincingly
demonstrates that Epstein vastly overstates the influence of classical liberal
thought on early American constitutional law. As Hovenkamp observes, while
constitutional Framers such as James Madison read and admired Adam Smith and
other leading lights of 18th-century liberalism, “[t]he economic views that
dominated in late 18th-century America favored active government involvement
in managing the economy,” and reflected a view of statecraft best described as
“pre-classical.”11 There was indeed a “classical constitutional revolution,”
Hovenkamp argues, but the “laissez faire doctrines that characterized 19th-century
legal classicism actually came into existence 40 or more years after the Constitution
was ratified,” in the Jacksonian campaign against special legislative privileges. 12
My object in this Response is both to extend Professor Hovenkamp’s critique
of The Classical Liberal Constitution, and to add a significant caveat. In brief, while
I heartily agree with Hovenkamp’s contention “that the Constitution was not
classical in its inception,” and that classical liberal tropes of economic liberty and
limited government gained a serious hearing only decades later, 13 I believe that
Hovenkamp in fact concedes too much. It is undoubtedly true that Jacksonian
hostility toward certain forms of government involvement in economic
development—for example, state-sanctioned monopolies, special tax exemptions,
and direct public subsidies financed through municipal bonds 14—helped to propel
the constellation of 19th-century doctrinal developments15 that both Epstein and
Hovenkamp identify with classical liberal constitutionalism. 16 In my judgment,
10. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 5.
11. Herbert Hovenkamp, Inventing the Classical Constitution, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1, 4, 10 (2015).
Professor Edward Purcell’s contribution to this exchange, which was published while the present
Response was in the late stages of the editing process, is devastating on this count, concluding after an
exhaustive analysis of the history and historiography of the Founding era that the “classical liberal
Constitution” that Epstein describes comes not from the worldview of the Founders, but from the
distinctly modern “libertarian, free market views and values that he projects [onto] them.” Edward A.
Purcell, Jr., What Changes in American Constitutional Law and What Does Not?, 102 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE
64, 114 (2017); see id. at 89–128 (stating that Epstein approaches history in an effort to support his own
“preconceived paradigms”); see also generally Samuel R. Olken, The Refracted Constitution: Classical
Liberalism and the Lessons of History, 101 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 74 (2016) (disputing Epstein’s historical
claims that the Founders embedded a classical liberal worldview into the Constitution).
12. Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 4.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 19–20.
15. These include the narrowing of the federal commerce power; the expanded application of the
Contract Clause; the extension beyond traditional eminent domain of compensation requirements for
private property damaged by state-sponsored economic development, and the development of
“substantive due process.” See id. at 19–40.
16. Stark differences remain, of course. Epstein presumably views such developments as the
logical extension of the classical liberal worldview of the framers, see EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 147–57
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however, both accounts overstate the extent to which the antebellum Supreme
Court’s heightened vigilance represents an approach to constitutionalism that we
can accurately term “classically liberal.” First, some of those developments—most
notably the Court’s curtailment of certain monopolies under the Contracts Clause
and its later adoption of “substantive due process”—were more discrete and
ambivalent with respect to state economic regulation than the term implies. 17
Second, and more significantly, the narrative of classical liberal ascendancy—of a
judiciary vigilantly defending liberty and property against unwarranted
governmental interference—is belied by the vast and dense web of state economic
regulation left untouched by the handful of high-profile decisions on which
constitutional scholars tend to focus. 18 Under their traditional common law police
powers, states and municipalities throughout the 19th century encroached on
individual liberty and property in myriad ways, setting rates for the transportation
of people and goods; enforcing licensing requirements for a host of occupations;
curbing private profit by prohibiting the resale of consumer products; and

(addressing the Court’s early 19th century Commerce Clause jurisprudence). Hovenkamp, on the other
hand, argues that they reflected the belated “invention” of classical liberal constitutionalism decades
later. See Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 52.
17. “Substantive due process” is discussed at length in Part II. See infra Part II. With respect to the
Contracts Clause, Professor Hovenkamp may put too much stock in the Taney Court’s relative suspicion
toward to state grants of monopoly and other special privileges. See Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 14–
19. Consider, for example, the Charles River Bridge case, in which the new Chief Justice famously held
that a state charter issued to the proprietors of the Charles River Bridge fifty years earlier had not
implied a perpetual monopoly. See generally Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of
the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837). On the one hand, that holding expressed a strong
presumption against monopoly and in favor of economic competition; accordingly, Hovenkamp views
the Charles River Bridge case as a quintessential symbol of classical liberal constitutionalism.
Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 21 (“No decision symbolizes the rise of classical constitutionalism better
than the Charles River Bridge case . . . .”). On the other hand, Taney’s opinion for the five-justice majority
reads less like a manifesto for laissez faire constitutionalism than a forceful defense of precisely the kind
of active, robust state regulatory authority discussed below in Part I. Because “[t]he object and end of
all government, is to promote the happiness and prosperity of the community by which it is
established,” Taney reasoned:
[I]t can never be assumed, that the government intended to diminish its power of
accomplishing the end for which it was created . . . . A state ought never to be presumed
to surrender this power; because . . . the whole community have an interest in preserving
it undiminished . . . . While the rights of private property are sacredly guarded, we must
not forget, that the community also have rights; and that the happiness and well-being of
every citizen depends on their faithful preservation.
Charles River Bridge, 26 U.S. at 422. In this reading, Taney’s purpose in Charles River Bridge was less to
vindicate the economic liberty of the competing proprietors than to ensure that the state retained its
broad authority to induce new economic development projects deemed to serve the public interest.
18. See, e.g., supra note 17 (discussing Hovenkamp’s reading of the Charles River Bridge case); see
also Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (invalidating the state’s
revocation of the college’s corporate charter on the ground that the college had a vested contractual
right in the charter); Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856) (striking down a state law prohibiting
the sale of intoxicating liquors because the law interfered with the vested property rights of sellers).
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prescribing the times and places for buying and selling.19 Although such
encroachments should be anathema to the classical liberal constitutionalist, 19thcentury courts consistently and emphatically upheld them against legal challenge.
Nor was the persistence—indeed, flourishing—of a robust police power a
mere exception, or counterpoint, to a dominant classical liberal view of statecraft.
Rather, Epstein’s neglect of the police power underscores his more fundamental
misunderstanding of the “basic common law protections of life, liberty and
property.”20 The police power was itself a common law doctrine, and comprised
the heart of a common law vision of governance in which individual rights, including
the rights to liberty and property, were conceived not as natural, inviolable
bulwarks against governmental intrusion, but as relative and relational, defined in
equipoise with the authority of the state to regulate in the interest of the general
welfare.21 In short, when we consider the common law vision of public authority
and private rights as it was understood and practiced by 19th-century lawmakers
and courts, the economic rights at the center of modern classical liberal revivalism
bear little resemblance to Epstein’s citadels of negative liberty. A Constitution that
actually embodied “the basic common law protections of life, liberty, and property”
would look nothing like the grand charter of classical liberalism that Epstein
describes.
This Response proceeds in two Parts. Part I describes the extraordinary
breadth of state police regulations throughout the 19th-century United States, the
virtually unanimous endorsement of robust regulatory authority by courts, and the
implications of this history for classical liberal constitutionalism’s historical
pedigree. Part II then analyzes the rise of “substantive due process” and “liberty of
contract,” from the Slaughterhouse Cases in 1873 up through the New Deal
constitutional “revolution” of 1937. It argues that even during the so-called Lochner
era—the high-water mark of classical liberal constitutionalism if there ever was
one—the Court’s defense of economic liberty against state interference was both
more equivocal and more discrete than modern classical liberal constitutionalists
might wish. Moreover, to the extent that Lochner-era police powers jurisprudence
did instantiate something resembling Epstein’s classical liberal ideal, that triumph
was remarkably short-lived.
I.

THE POLICE POWER AND THE “BASIC COMMON LAW PROTECTIONS OF LIFE, LIBERTY,
AND PROPERTY”

The Classical Liberal Constitution remains curiously aloof from the actual
history of economic regulation before the ascendency of the “progressive mindset”
in the 1930s. In fact, generations of historians have chronicled the remarkable
extent to which public power was thoroughly enmeshed in American economic life
19. See WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA
90–96 (1996).
20. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 98.
21. See infra notes 24–73 and the accompanying text; see generally NOVAK, supra note 19.
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during the 19th century. 22 Even as Jacksonian lawmakers and judges decried the
scourge of special legislative privileges granted to favored enterprises, 23 states
remained deeply involved in economic development and regulation through the
funding of public works, subsidizing of “private” development projects, issuing of
corporate charters, the liberal exercise of eminent domain, and, as we shall see,
the routine exertion of a robust and far-reaching police power.24 As Michael Les
Benedict explained in a now-classic article, state and local governments actively
and consistently violated the fundamental tenets of laissez-faire by “promot[ing]
transportation development with tax abatements, debt guarantees, and public
subscription to stock issues,” and adopting “law after law promoting and
subsidizing economic development, regulating business practices, employment
conditions, and labor relations.” 25

22. See, e.g., OSCAR HANDLIN & MARY FLUG HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF
GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: MASSACHUSETTS 1774–1861 (Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press
rev. ed. 1969) (describing extensive governmental involvement in the development and direction of
productive enterprise); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW (1957)
(describing an antebellum police power that was broadly accommodative of economic regulation and
reform); HARRY N. SCHEIBER, OHIO CANAL ERA: A CASE STUDY OF GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY, 1820–1861
(2012) (describing the critical role of state policy in supporting and directing antebellum economic
development). For helpful discussions of the “commonwealth” histories, see William J. Novak, The Legal
Origins of the Modern American State, in LOOKING BACK AT LAW’S CENTURY 249 (Austin Sarat, Bryant Garth,
& Robert A. Kagan eds., 2002); and Harry N. Scheiber, Government and the Economy: Studies of the
“Commonwealth” Policy in Nineteenth-Century America, 3 J. INTERDISC. HIST. 135 (1972). On the 19thcentury state’s active involvement in economic regulation and development, see JAMES WILLARD HURST,
LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956), which one leading
scholar characterizes as “from beginning to end an implicit repudiation of the notion that Americans
adhered to laissez-faire doctrines in the 1800s.” Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A ReEvaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 L. & HIST. REV. 293, 297 n.15
(1985).
23. See infra notes 68–72 and accompanying text.
24. Matthew J. Lindsay, In Search of “Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism,” 123 HARV. L. REV. F. 55, 60–
61 (2010).
25. Benedict, supra note 22, at 302. Federal authority, as well, penetrated social life and shaped
economic development in myriad (if sometimes inconspicuous) ways throughout the 19th century. See
generally BRIAN BALOGH, A GOVERNMENT OUT OF SIGHT: THE MYSTERY OF NATIONAL AUTHORITY IN NINETEENTHCENTURY AMERICA 13, 20 (2009) (demonstrating that “a national legal structure laid the foundation for
integrated markets, transportation systems, and . . . the modern business corporation” in 19th-century
America, but that modern-day “classical liberal ideology [has] effaced the crucial role played by
government in the national development). As William Novak explains, the reality of federal governance
through the nation’s history “bears not the slightest resemblance to ideas about American laissez-faire,
voluntarism, or anti-statism.” William J. Novak, The Myth of the “Weak” American State, 113 AM. HIST.
REV. 752, 760 (2008). He writes:
From the founding of the first national governing institutions to the conquest of western
lands; from the creation of a vast public infrastructure for the promotion of commerce to
the construction of a powerful defense and military establishment; from the expansion of
governmental powers of police, regulation, administration, and redistribution to the
invention of new ways of policing citizens, aliens, races, morals, and gender relations in
the production of national culture, the infrastructural power of the American state seems
at times boundless, even borderless, as American legal, corporate, economic, and cultural
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Although the police power has never lent itself to easy definition, the 1851
case of Commonwealth v. Alger serves as an important touchstone.26 The case
pitted the rights of riparian landowner Curtis Alger to construct a wharf on his
Boston Harbor property against “the just powers of the legislature to limit, control,
or regulate the exercise . . . of [those] rights.” 27 The court’s opinion upholding the
challenged regulation was written by Massachusetts Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw, the
leading common law jurist of the era.28 Chief Justice Shaw’s description of the state
police power is particularly illuminating with respect to the “common law
protections of life, liberty and property” that, in Epstein’s view, served as the
fundamental measure of individual rights during the 150-year heyday of classical
liberal constitutionalism.29 “All property in this commonwealth,” Shaw explained,
“is derived directly or indirectly from the government, and held subject to those
general regulations, which are necessary to the common good and general
welfare.”30 By virtue of the state’s “dominion and sovereignty” over its lands, he
continued, “[r]ights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are
subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment . . . as the legislature . . .
may think necessary and expedient.” 31 These are not the property rights of classical
liberal lore—natural, pre-social rights protected against all but the most essential
governmental encroachment by a strong judicial “presumption of error.” To the
contrary, Alger’s “vested interest in the soil”—a fee simple absolute, in the
language of the common law—was a “social and conventional right[],” the meaning
and scope of which were necessarily fluid and relative, subject to evolving
legislative conceptions of the “common good” and of regulatory expediency. 32
Nor was the relative nature of individual rights confined to the maintenance
of public waterways and other public resources. The “police power,” Shaw
explained, was “vested in the legislature . . . [to] establish all manner of wholesome
and reasonable laws . . . as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth.”33 Indeed, neither the result in Alger nor the terms in which Shaw
addressed “the relative rights of the public and of individual proprietors” were
unusual.34 Chief Justice Shaw was merely giving expression to a broadly shared legal
forms spread across the globe. It is this power—infrastructural power—that renders
commentary about American state weakness or statelessness unintelligible.
Id. at 763.
26. Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851).
27. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) at 65.
28. Id. On Shaw’s extraordinary stature and influence, see Leonard Levy, Lemuel Shaw: America’s
“Greatest Magistrate,” 7 VILL. L. REV. 389 (arguing that “no other state judge through his opinions had
so great an influence on the course of American law”).
29. See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 98.
30. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) at 85.
31. Id. at 84–85.
32. Id. at 71, 85.
33. Id. at 85.
34. Id. at 64.
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worldview that, as historian William Novak writes, “fostered and legitimated the
pervasive role of police and regulation in early American economy and society: the
common law vision of a well-regulated society.” 35 Within that vision, Novak
explains, rights operated not as “absolute shields . . . protecting individuals from
society and government,”36 but rather were “guaranteed actively and relatively in
an ongoing calculation of the reciprocal rights and duties of others and the good of
the whole in a constantly changing society.” 37
Although the police power restricted economic liberty and private property in
myriad and profound ways, it was not boundless. Contrary to Epstein’s assertion,
however, the limits of that power generally were not enforced by state courts’
“solicitude for the rights of life, liberty, and property that lay at the core of the
natural rights tradition.” 38 Rather, they were defined by the constitutive terms of
the police power itself—specifically, the requirement that regulation serve the
common good and general welfare of the commonwealth. In this way, the “public
health, morals and welfare” constituted a finite universe of the police power’s
legitimate ends. When evaluating the legal permissibility of a particular regulation,
writes political scientist Howard Gillman, “[t]he issue in contention . . . was not the
importance of the liberty but the character of the legislation: did it actually promote
the good of the public or was it designed to promote the special interests of some
favored groups?”39
Within those broad limits, economic regulation routinely extended far beyond
the discrete, targeted interventions that might be compatible with the classical
liberal night-watchman state, such as controlling monopoly, regulating noxious
trades, abating fire hazards and other public nuisances, and preventing the spread
of infectious disease. As Professor Hovenkamp observes, states and municipalities
enacted hundreds of statutes and ordinances policing public morals, commonly
targeting such evils as drunkenness, prostitution, gambling, vagrancy, profanity,
adultery, fornication, obscenity, and the like. 40 Perhaps more importantly for our
purposes, however, they also aggressively and conspicuously limited precisely the
kinds of “private” economic enterprise for which some Lochner-era jurists and
modern classical liberals would later seek constitutional protection. States and
municipalities established strict licensing requirements for a broad range of
commercial activities, including the mere trading or selling of otherwise lawful
goods. Under Maryland law, for example, it was unlawful to “expose for sale, or
35. NOVAK, supra note 19, at 26.
36. Id. at 34.
37. Id. at 36.
38. See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 13.
39. Howard Gillman, Preferred Freedoms: The Progressive Expansion of State Power and the Rise
of Modern Civil Liberties Jurisprudence, 47 POL. RES. Q. 623, 633–34 (1994) (emphasis in original).
40. Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 5. Some regulations were more far-reaching. Connecticut’s
criminal code, for example, included proscriptions on “any games, tricks, plays, shows, tumbling, rope
dancing, puppet shows, or feats of uncommon dexterity or agility of body.” 1830 Conn. Pub. Acts 275
(quoted in NOVAK, supra note 19, at 155).
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sell, any goods, wares or merchandise, with a view to profit in the way of trade”
without first obtaining a “license to trade.”41 State legislatures also controlled the
prices of consumer goods, and reigned in what they considered excessive profits
by proscribing the resale of various goods for gain. 42 And municipalities extensively
regulated the times and places in which ordinary commodities could be sold. 43 Such
examples not only testify to the pervasive regulation of market exchange
throughout the supposed heyday of classical liberal constitutionalism; they belie
the basic classical liberal separation of private economy and public authority into
distinct spheres.
Moreover, state courts upheld the vast majority of such regulations on the
basis of municipal corporations’ far-reaching authority to circumscribe private
economic transactions in the service of the public good. Consider the leading case
of Village of Buffalo v. Webster, decided by the New York Supreme Court of
Judicature in 1833. 44 The defendant, a farmer, had been convicted of violating a
municipal ordinance prohibiting “the hawking of meats about the streets of the
village.”45 Webster’s crime consisted of exchanging a leg of lamb with a local grocer
for a pound of tea, outside of the market district defined in the ordinance. 46
Webster argued on appeal that “[to] require [a] farmer and [a] grocer [to] march
off to the prescribed bounds, and there make their contract for the exchange of
the meat for the tea, and then formally return to the shop of the grocer and perfect
the contract by the delivery of the articles,” amounted to an “unreasonable and
improper[] restrain[t] [of] trade.” 47
The court’s brief opinion upholding Webster’s conviction captures the breadth
of public authority in Jacksonian New York. “At common law,” the court began,
municipal corporations such as Buffalo had the power to “make by-laws, for the
general good” so long as they “be reasonable and for the common benefit,” and do
not “restrain[] . . . trade, nor impose a burden without an apparent benefit.” 48 The
challenged ordinance easily satisfied those modest conditions.49 The court drew a
sharp distinction between the restraint of trade, which was prohibited at common
law, and its mere regulation, which was permitted. 50 “[A] by-law that no meat
should be sold in the village would be bad, being a general restraint,” the court
explained; however, a law “imposing particular restraints as to [the] time and
place” that meat may be sold was not “a restraint of the right to sell meat, but a

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

1827 Md. Laws 1085 (quoted in NOVAK, supra note 19, at 91).
NOVAK, supra note 19, at 94.
Id. at 95–99.
See generally Vill. of Buffalo v. Webster, 10 Wend. 99 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833).
Id. at 100.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 102.
Vill. of Buffalo v. Webster, 10 Wend. 99, 101–02 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833).
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regulation of that right.”51 A mere regulation of trade, even a particularly
inconvenient regulation that encumbered commerce, did not constitute an
impermissible restraint. The court likewise affirmed without comment that the
burden imposed by the regulation carried a “correspondent benefit,” and that the
regulation was “reasonable in itself, and promotive of the public good.”52
Consider also In re Nightingale, decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts in 1831.53 The defendant, a farmer, had been convicted of violating
a Boston ordinance forbidding an inhabitant of Boston or any town “in the vicinity
thereof” from “vending commodities” that were not “the produce of his own farm,
or of some farm in his neighbourhood,” at Faneuil Hall market or on two adjacent
streets, without first obtaining permission from the official market clerk. 54 Such
prohibitions on the resale of consumer goods at public markets were common
during the antebellum era, 55 and were modeled after English statutes and
traditional common law offenses intended to prevent the unjust inflation of
consumer prices by various forms of profiteering.56 Nightingale’s crime consisted
of selling, in addition to the “produce of his own farm,” lambs that he had bought
the previous week and “carcasses of sheep . . . bought some months before.”57 On
appeal, Nightingale argued that the ordinance was invalid on two distinct grounds:
First, it was “partial and did not operate on all the citizens of the commonwealth
equally” because it distinguished between “the inhabitants of Boston and its
vicinity, and the inhabitants of distant towns in the commonwealth.” 58 Second, the
ordinance was void for “uncertainty” because it failed to identify the specific towns
contemplated to be within “‘the vicinity’ of Boston,” and thus lodged excessive
discretion in the market clerk to order the removal of unauthorized sellers from the
market.59

51. Id. at 101 (emphasis in original).
52. Id. at 102.
53. In re Nightingale, 28 Mass. (11 Pick.) 168 (1831).
54. Id. at 171.
55. See NOVAK, supra note 19, at 94–95.
56. Such “offenses against public trade” included “forestalling,” “regrating,” and “engrossing.”
According to William Blackstone’s widely cited definitions, forestalling was “the buying or contracting
for any merchandize or victual coming in the way to market; or disuading [sic] persons from bringing
their goods or provisions there; or persuading them to enhance the price, when there: any of which
practices make the market dearer to the fair trader.” WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 160 (10th ed. 1787). Regrating was “the buying of corn, or other dead victual, in any market,
and selling them again in the same market, or within four miles of the place. For this also enhances the
price of the provisions, as every successive seller must have a successive profit.” Id. Engrossing was “the
getting into one’s possession, or buying up, large quantities of corn or other dead victuals, with intent
to sell them again. This must of course be injurious to the public, by putting it in the power or one or
two rich men to raise the price of provisions at their own discretion.” Id.
57. Nightingale, 28 Mass. (11 Pick.) at 171.
58. Id. at 171 (emphasis added).
59. In re Nightingale, 28 Mass. (11 Pick.) 168, 171–72 (1831).
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The court soundly rejected each of these arguments: “[T]he partial operation
of the ordinance can be no objection to its validity,” the court explained, “provided
it does not infringe private rights; and it is very clear that it does not.” 60 Because
“[t]he city government had an undoubted right to prohibit the occupation of a
stand in the streets by any one,” it reasoned, there was “certainly nothing
contained in the ordinance . . . which can be pretended to operate as a violation of
private rights; nor does it operate as an improper restraint on trade, but is a
wholesome regulation of it, to prevent the market from being unnecessarily
thronged and incumbered [sic].” 61 Neither was the ordinance “void for
uncertainty.” Although the term “vicinity” was “somewhat indefinite,” the court
acknowledged, the question of whether the defendant lived “in the vicinity” of
Boston was “properly left [for] the jury.” 62 If Nightingale had been fined for the
“mere occupation” of the stand in question, the court acknowledged, the objection
might carry more weight.63 But he incurred a penalty only after refusing to vacate
the stand when he was ordered to do so.64 In these cases and many others, state
courts upheld the authority of municipalities at common law and under their
charters to interject public power into the most mundane of private commercial
transactions—in Webster, the exchange of meat and tea at a location that was
mutually convenient to the parties; in Nightingale, the resale of consumer goods
for profit.
To be sure, Jacksonian courts and legislatures did limit the police power in
meaningful ways. Judges were prepared to void legislation that violated vested
property rights;65 and legislators adopted myriad statutes and constitutional
provisions prohibiting the granting of special privileges.66 Because such official
hostility toward legislative overreaching was often couched in an idiom of laissez
faire, later-day libertarians are sometimes inclined to read into pre-Civil War
jurisprudence constitutional economic rights that appeared only decades later. The
cases discussed above illustrate two critical counterpoints to that inclination: First,
both regulators and reviewing courts understood and applied the police power as
a fundamental, far-reaching, and uncontroversial form of public authority—a
conception of governance that is difficult to reconcile with the classical liberal
worldview that Epstein ascribes to the period. Second, and perhaps even more
importantly, even during the supposed acme of laissez faire constitutionalism
before the Civil War, an individual “right” was not, as Epstein imagines it, an
60. Id. at 173–74.
61. Id. at 174.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 174–75.
65. See Benedict, supra note 22, at 324–25 (describing judicial disapproval of “retrospective
legislation” that disturbed vested rights in property).
66. See id. at 322 (discussing the adoption of various state constitutional prohibitions on the
granting of special legislative privileges, including the commitment of public funds, loans, or credit
pledges in support of private enterprise).
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autonomous sphere of liberty and property into which the state could not intrude.
Rather, a “right” served as a guarantee that the state could only interfere with
one’s liberty or property through general laws that were reasonably adapted to
serve a public purpose. Consider, again, Nightingale: It was precisely because the
City of Boston had the “undoubted right” to prohibit the reselling of consumer
goods at the public market that there was “certainly nothing contained in the
ordinance . . . which can be pretended to operate as a violation of private rights.” 67
Here, the Massachusetts court’s basic understanding of an individual “right” stands
in sharp contrast to the modern conception of individual “rights” as inviolable, or
at least “fundamental.” From the nation’s Founding until the beginning of the 20th
century, explains Gillman, judges protected liberty primarily by asking “whether a
law actually promoted a valid public purpose rather than whether a law violated an
important liberty.” 68 In other words, “the nature of the legislative power prohibited
legislatures from interfering with people’s liberty or property unless such
interference was necessary to advance the general welfare of the community as a
whole.”69
This meant that judges were on the lookout not for intrusions of public power
into a sphere of private liberty, but for “laws that appeared to advance only the
narrow interests of certain classes, or that had no discernible impact on public
health, safety, or morality.” 70 Such partial laws, or “class legislation,” as they were
later termed, “could be struck down as corrupt, arbitrary, and outside the scope of
the police powers.”71 Some antebellum courts did begin to import “substantive”
protection of liberty and property into their state due process (or “law of the land”)
provisions. Critically, however, that substance consisted not in a freedom to
exercise one’s private commercial prerogatives, but in protection against “special
legislation [that] transferred property from one person to another without due
process of law.”72 This is precisely why the Webster court emphasized that the
challenged market regulation was a “general” one that was “reasonable and for the
common benefit.”73 In a “regime of limited government powers” like the
antebellum United States, Gillman pointedly notes, “the rights and liberties of the
citizens are protected residually: on this view, freedom is what is left over after
67. In re Nightingale, 28 Mass. (11 Pick.) 168, 174 (1831).
68. Gillman, supra note 39, at 624.
69. Id. at 629.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 629–30.
72. Benedict, supra note 22, at 325. “[A]ntebellum American law was suffused with the principle
that special legislation was illegitimate,” Benedict explains, and as early as 1819 attorneys and courts
had begun to link that conviction “to the fundamental maxim that no person could be deprived of
property but by due process or law or by the laws of the land.” Id. at 326. As Ryan Williams explains, by
the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, the phrase “due process of law” already “had
developed . . . well-established substantive connotations as both a prohibition of legislative interference
with vested rights and as a guarantee of general and impartial laws.” Ryan C. Williams, The One and
Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 416 (2010).
73. Vill. of Buffalo v. Webster, 10 Wend. 100, 101 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833).
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government has reached the limits of its authorized power.” 74 It was only much
later, in the 20th century, that state and federal courts developed a jurisprudence
of “fundamental” rights, or “preferred freedoms,” the interference with which
triggered heightened judicial scrutiny. 75
This was the common-law vision of statecraft that prevailed in the United
States throughout the antebellum era, and it does not at all reflect “the classical
liberal position that all state action should be examined under a presumption of
error.”76 Indeed, the municipal officials, state legislators, and common law judges
who executed that vision would not have recognized the modern “fundamental
rights” framework that Epstein anachronistically projects onto them. Accordingly,
the defendants in Webster and Nightingale—men whose freedom to engage in
remarkably ordinary commercial transactions was significantly encumbered—did
not even challenge the ordinances under the due process clauses (or other libertyprotecting provisions) of their state constitutions. 77 Why would sophisticated and
resourceful attorneys arguing before judges who supposedly were steeped in
classical liberal constitutionalism and thus primed to approach every interference
with individual liberty and property under a presumption of error, neglect to argue
that the enforcement of the ordinances had violated their clients’ constitutional
rights? The answer is that they wouldn’t.
II.

CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND “LIBERTY OF CONTRACT”

Part I argued that the historical pedigree for classical liberal constitutionalism
is remarkably weak, and that the “long historical run of about 150 years” that
Epstein claims for the classical view was nothing of the sort. 78 But what about the
Lochner era79—the decades preceding the New Deal “revolution” in constitutional
law, when, as every law student learns, courts imposed a host of new, or at least
newly robust, constraints on the authority of both the state and federal
governments to regulate private commercial transactions? Although the Lochner
era and its conceptual centerpiece, “liberty of contract,” have long been derided
by legal liberals and conservatives alike as ideologically motivated judicial
74. Gillman, supra note 39, at 625.
75. Id. at 624–25.
76. See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 304.
77. Rather, their facial challenges to the ordinances centered on the allegation that the laws were
“partial” (and therefore invalid) because they benefited some narrow class of persons rather than the
general public. They also raised “as applied” challenges. For example, Webster argued that the timeand-place regulation was intended to prevent only the “hawking of meats about the streets of the
village,” and not to apply to in-kind trades of the sort for which Webster had been prosecuted. See
Webster, 10 Wend. at 100. Nightingale argued that he had not violated the prohibition of reselling
because “a large portion, perhaps half in value, of the articles in his wagon were the produce of his own
farm.” In re Nightingale, 28 Mass. (11 Pick.) 168, 172 (1831).
78. See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 34.
79. The term comes from the Supreme Court’s famous decision in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905), striking down a maximum hours law for bakers as a violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
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activism,80 a host of recent works by libertarian-leaning legal scholars—with such
titles as Rehabilitating Lochner and Liberty of Contract: Rediscovering a Lost
Constitutional Right—have sought to rescue constitutional economic liberty from
disrepute.81 Even if Epstein misattributes a classical liberal worldview to the
Constitution’s Framers and seriously exaggerates the influence of classical
liberalism in the pre-Civil War period, one might nevertheless argue that the
decades preceding the New Deal constitutional “revolution” provide a sound, if
substantially narrower, historical foundation for Epstein’s theory of constitutional
interpretation.
This Part has three primary goals: First, it explains that the species of
constitutional economic liberty that Epstein mistakenly ascribes to the period
between the nation’s founding and the Civil War—a liberty against governmental
meddling, the interference with which triggers exacting scrutiny—was instead
developed in the decades following the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Second, it demonstrates that even during the Lochner era—the supposed highwater mark of laissez faire constitutionalism—”liberty of contract” constrained
economic regulation in much more discrete ways than is commonly supposed.
Finally, it argues that if we take the long view, the brief ascendancy of constitutional
economic liberty during the first three decades of the 20th century is most usefully
understood not as the belated fulfillment of a classical liberal worldview woven
into the constitutional fabric a century earlier, but rather as a contentious,
uncertain, and somewhat muddled process of regulatory and constitutional
adaptation, in which the Court worked out how to apply the long-standing common
law prohibition against special legislative privileges in a modern industrial setting. 82

80. Lochner, in particular, continues to occupy a central place in the debate over the proper scope
of judicial review. During the litigation over the Affordable Care Act, for example, both President Obama
and Solicitor General Donald Verilli invoked Lochner as a caution to the Court against abandoning judicial
restraint. See Matthew J. Lindsay, Federalism and Phantom Economic Rights in NFIB v. Sebelius, 82 U.
CINCINNATI L. REV. 687, 691 n.12 (2014). Prominent conservatives, including Robert Bork and Chief Justice
John Roberts, have also publicly denounced Lochner as a “judicial usurpation” of legislative power. See
id. On the use and abuse of Lochner in modern constitutional discourse, see Gary D. Rowe, Lochner
Revisionism Revisited, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 221, 223 (1999) (describing the “ghost of Lochner” in postNew Deal constitutional litigation). The origin of this rhetorical tradition lies in Justice Holmes’
celebrated dissent in Lochner itself, chiding the majority for deciding the case based on its preferred
“economic theory” rather than constitutional principle, and thereby perverting the Fourteenth
Amendment to “prevent the natural outcome of dominant opinion.” Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes,
J., dissenting). On the “progressive” interpretation of Lochner inaugurated by Holmes’ dissent, and the
body of subsequent revisionist scholarship complicating that interpretation, see Lindsay, supra at 704–
05 and accompanying text.
81. See generally BERNSTEIN, supra note 1 (characterizing Lochner as a principled defense of
individual liberty); DAVID N. MAYER, LIBERTY OF CONTRACT: REDISCOVERING A LOST CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (2011)
(same).
82. The remainder of this Part draws extensively from Lindsay, supra note 80, at 704–730; and
Lindsay, supra note 24, at 70–77.
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A. THE (BELATED AND EQUIVOCAL) CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ECONOMIC LIBERTY
The jurisprudential foundations of “liberty of contract” were laid in the
decades following the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.83 In separate
dissenting opinions in the landmark 1873 Slaughter-House Cases,84 Justices
Stephen Field and Joseph Bradley famously argued that, in granting the Crescent
City Company a twenty-five year butchering monopoly, the Louisiana legislature
had deprived the butchers excluded from the monopoly of their privileges and
immunities as citizens of the United States, in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.85 In these and subsequent opinions, 86 Justices Field and Bradley
planted the seeds of a constitutional “right of free labor” that would, decades later,
blossom into “liberty of contract.” Their opinions are worth considering at some
length because they illustrate both the novelty of this particular constitutional
economic right, and its kinship with the common-law limits on the state police
power discussed in Part I. In brief, I want to suggest that Field and Bradley’s
constitutionalization of the “right of free labor” was less a defense of economic
liberty per se than a jurisdictional hook that enabled the federal courts to enforce
conditions on state legislative authority that were intrinsic to the police power
itself—specifically, that regulations of liberty and property serve the general
welfare, rather than the narrower interests of a favored group.
In the Slaughter-House Cases, a five-justice majority denied that the
Fourteenth Amendment had made the Court “a perpetual censor upon all
legislation of the States [touching] on the civil rights of their own citizens.” 87
83. My focus here is the development of an expansive, constitutionally novel understanding of
“liberty” and “property” in post-Civil War period. The origins of “substantive due process,” which would
later become the primary doctrinal vehicle for constitutional economic liberty, in fact precedes the Civil
War. See generally Williams, supra note 72 (demonstrating that when the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified in 1868, the phrase “due process of law” already “had developed . . . well-established
substantive connotations as both a prohibition of legislative interference with vested rights and as a
guarantee of general and impartial laws”). That said, the phrase “substantive due process” is itself a
much later invention. Although today we routinely refer to the “substantive due process” right to
“liberty of contract” (as well as a host of other modern “fundamental” rights), the term first appeared
in a federal court opinion only in the 1940s, and was not applied to Lochner-style “liberty of contract”
jurisprudence until the 1960s. See G. Edward White, Revisiting Substantive Due Process and Holmes’s
Lochner Dissent, 63 BROOKLYN L. REV. 87, 108–10 (1997). For this reason, this Response generally (though
not entirely) avoids applying the phrase to Lochner-era police powers jurisprudence, and instead refers
to the “due process right to liberty of contract,” or “economic due process.”
84. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
85. Id. at 83–111 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 111–24 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
86. After the Louisiana legislature subsequently revoked the butchering monopoly, the Crescent
City Company brought suit, claiming that because it had expended great sums on a vast slaughterhouse
and stockyard in reliance on its exclusive right, the legislative charter had taken on the character of an
“irrepealable contract.” Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City LiveStock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746, 749 (1884). The Court unanimously upheld the
repeal, but Justices Field and Bradley wrote separate concurring opinions in order to further theorize
the Fourteenth Amendment right to individual economic liberty. Id. at 754–60 (Field, J., concurring); id.
at 760–66 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
87. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 78.
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Justices Field and Bradley argued strenuously in dissent that Section I of the
Amendment had in fact upended the nation’s federal structure of “double
citizenship” in order “to provide National security against violation by the States of
the fundamental rights of the citizen.” 88 What exactly were the fundamental rights
of American citizenship? Field and Bradley agreed that when the Declaration of
Independence proclaimed that “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” were
among the “inalienable rights” endowed in all men by “their Creator,” it identified
“the fundamental rights which can only be taken away by due process of law, and
which can only be interfered with . . . by lawful regulations necessary or proper for
the mutual good of all.” 89 Here are Richard Epstein’s “common law protections of
life, liberty, and property.” 90
The contention that the Privileges and Immunities Clause authorized the
federal courts to vindicate the fundamental rights of national citizenship against
hostile state legislatures was not, by itself, especially remarkable. Most members
of Congress who drafted, debated, and adopted the Fourteenth Amendment would
have agreed, at least in principle, that Section 1 unsettled the nation’s traditional
federalism.91 Justices Field and Bradley’s innovation lies, instead, in the breadth of
meaning they ascribed to the phrase “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”
The right “to adopt such calling, profession, or trade” was “an essential part of that
liberty which it is the object of government to protect,” Bradley urged, “and a
calling, when chosen, is a man’s property and right. Liberty and property are not
protected where these rights are arbitrarily assailed.” 92 Justice Field agreed, in a
passage that would become an indispensable touchstone for late 19th-century
state high courts:
The equality of right . . . in the lawful pursuits of life . . . is the
distinguishing privilege of citizens of the United States. To them,
everywhere, all pursuits, all professions, all avocations are open without
other restrictions than such as are imposed equally upon all others . . . .
This is the fundamental idea upon which our institutions rest, and unless
adhered to in the legislation of the country our government will be a
republic only in name. The fourteenth amendment . . . makes it essential
. . . that this equality of right should be respected. . . . [B]y . . . the

88. Id. at 121–22 (Bradley, J., dissenting). Field agreed that as a result of Section 1, the
“fundamental rights, privileges, and immunities which belong to him as a free man and a free citizen,
now belong to him as a citizen of the United States, and are not dependent upon his citizenship of any
State.” Id. at 95 (Field, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 122 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 116 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
90. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 98.
91. See e.g. GARRETT EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE FIGHT FOR EQUAL
RIGHTS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 226–28 (2006) (quoting leading congressional advocates of the
Amendment, including Thaddeus Stevens and John Bingham, to that effect); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 72–80 (1988) (same).
92. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 110 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
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[butchering monopoly] the right of free labor, one of the most sacred and
imprescriptible rights of man, is violated. 93
Of what, exactly, did the “sacred and imprescriptible” right of “free labor” consist?
Field quoted at length one of the seminal texts of classical liberal political economy,
Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations:
‘The property which every man has in his own labor,’ says Adam Smith,
‘as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most
sacred and inviolable. The patrimony of the poor man lies in the strength
and dexterity of his own hands; and to hinder him from employing this
strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper, without injury
to his neighbor, is a plain violation of this most sacred property. It is a
manifest encroachment upon the just liberty both of the workman and
of those who might be disposed to employ him.’94
The most important jurisprudential legacy of Field’s opinion lies in this radical
redefinition of constitutional “liberty” and “property.” For Field, “property”
encompassed not only land and tangible goods, but anything with market value,
including one’s labor; “liberty” referred not only to physical freedom, but freedom
to act in the marketplace. This was a vision of individual economic liberty adapted
not to a republic of independent artisans and craftsmen, but to the propertyless
hirelings who increasingly populated the swelling industrial labor force—men
whose economic personhood consisted entirely in their capacity to alienate their
labor for a price. 95 It was also a vision that resonated deeply with the great moral
and political cause of the previous generation—the abolition of slavery.
Abolitionists had celebrated the voluntary sale of labor as the antithesis of slavery;
and the right to dispose of one’s labor at market price had taken on the moral and
emotional weight of opposing human bondage. Slave emancipation and the Civil

93. Id. at 109–10 (Field, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 110 n.39 (Field, J., dissenting) (quoting ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776)); see
Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing &
Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746, 757 (1884) (Field, J., concurring) (quoting the same passage).
95. In the 1870s, a time of rapid industrialization in the northern states, the meaning of “free
labor” was an ideologically freighted subject of social and political debate. As the traditional centerpiece
of republican political theory, the “free labor” ideal had long been embodied in the figure of the selfemployed farmer or artisan, whose ownership of productive property served as a guarantee of
economic self-sufficiency, and thus personal “independence”—the essential requisite for virtuous
citizenship. To labor for a wage, by contrast, was to subject one’s personal autonomy, including one’s
economic livelihood and even political will, to the authority of an employer. See LAWRENCE B. GLICKMAN,
A LIVING WAGE: AMERICAN WORKERS AND THE MAKING OF CONSUMER SOCIETY 22–24 (1997); DAVID MONTGOMERY,
BEYOND EQUALITY: LABOR AND THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS, 1862–1872, at 30–33 (1967); AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM
BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 9–10
(1998). For Field, the New Orleans butchers, who were struggling against a legislative monopoly that
threatened to deprive them of their independence and reduce them to the condition of mere wage
laborers, were exemplars of this free labor ideal. By championing the butchers’ “equality of right . . . in
the ordinary avocations of life,” Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 109, Field was attempting
to vindicate their republican independence. See Lindsay, supra note 24, at 70–71.
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Rights Act of 1866, securing the right to contract for the sale of one’s labor as an
essential right of citizenship, enshrined this vision into law.96 It was this notion of a
constitutional right of property in, and liberty to dispose of, one’s labor that would
later ripen into “liberty of contract.”
Surely this is music to classical liberal ears. Yet even as Justices Field and
Bradley characterized the “right to free labor” as a “sacred and imprescriptible”
privilege of U.S. citizenship, the constitutional limitation they actually applied bears
a closer affinity with the common law proscription of special privileges, or “class
legislation,” than with the protection of individual economic liberty per se. The
right to free labor, Field explained, protected the citizen only against
“discriminating and partial enactments, favoring some to the impairment of the
rights of others.” 97 It thus served as a constitutional bulwark against the “arbitrary
invasion by State authority of . . . the right to pursue . . . happiness unrestrained,
except by just, equal, and impartial laws.”98 It was not the regulation of butchering
per se that troubled Field and Bradley, or even the legislature’s interference with
the economic prerogatives of individual butchers; but rather its unjust, “partial,”
“arbitrary” discrimination against a disfavored class of butchers.99 A few years later,

96. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.); see also STANLEY, supra note 95, at 17–18 (discussing the role of abolitionism in the moral and
legal construction of “free labor”); William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law
in the Gilded Age, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 767, 782–86 (1985) (same). In defining the privileges and immunities
that the Fourteenth Amendment protected from state abridgement, Justice Field drew explicitly from
the Civil Rights Act. Although passed before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, Field
explained, the Act expressed Congress’ understanding of the term “privileges and immunities” as it was
used in Section I. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 96 (Field, J., dissenting). That
understanding included, Field wrote, quoting directly from the Act, the right “to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real
and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
person and property.” Id. (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31 § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981)). Among such rights, Field continued, “must be placed the right to pursue
a lawful employment in a lawful manner, without other restraint than such as equally effects all
persons.” Id. at 97.
97. Butchers’ Union, 111 U.S. at 758 (Field, J., concurring). Leading scholars of Lochner-era police
powers jurisprudence have interpreted Field and Bradley’s opinions in this light, tracing Lochner-era
judicial scrutiny of economic regulations to Jacksonian opposition to special legislative privileges. See
HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS
JURISPRUDENCE 64–76 (1993). Intellectual-biographical studies of leading late 19th-century figures in the
constitutionalization of individual economic liberty persuasively present jurists such as Stephen Field
and the judge and treatise author Thomas Cooley not as laissez-faire ideologues, but rather as principled
neo-Jacksonians, committed to the defense of the general good against the corrupting influence of
powerful economic interests. See generally Alan Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and “Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism”: A Reconsideration, 53 J. AM. HIST. 751 (1967); Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and
the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism, 1863–1897, 61 J. AM. HIST. 970 (1975).
98. Butchers’ Union, 111 U.S. at 759 (Field, J., concurring).
99. Id. at 758. Justice Field continued:
[T]he ordinary pursuits of life, forming the large mass of industrial avocations, are and
ought to be free and open to all, subject only to such general regulations, applying equally
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in upholding a different legislative restraint on the pursuit of one’s chosen vocation
against an economic due process challenge, Field explained that the “great purpose
of the requirement [of due process] is to exclude everything that is arbitrary and
capricious in legislation affecting the rights of the citizen.”100 But “legislation is not
open to the charge of depriving one of his rights without due process of law, if it be
general in its operation upon the subjects to which it relates . . . .”101 And in fact,
the New Orleans butchering monopoly was widely viewed at the time as an act of
naked legislative favoritism.102 Understood as a demand for legislative impartiality,
the Fourteenth Amendment right to economic liberty appears not as constitutional
trump against state economic regulation, but rather as a convenient jurisdictional
hook through which the federal courts might enforce constraints on legislative
authority that were intrinsic to the police power itself.
B. “LIBERTY OF CONTRACT” AND THE (SORT OF) CLASSICAL LIBERAL MOMENT
The seed of constitutional economic liberty planted by Justices Field and
Bradley bore fruit almost immediately. 103 Several state high court opinions from
the 1880s striking down labor regulations read like tributes to the Slaughterhouse
dissents. As the New York Court of Appeals declared in 1885, “[l]iberty, in its broad
sense as understood in this country, means the right, not only of freedom from
actual servitude, imprisonment or restraint, but the right of one to use his faculties
in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood in any lawful
calling, and to pursue any lawful trade or avocation.” 104 Then in 1897, the U.S.

to all, as the general good may demand; and the grant to the favored few of a monopoly
in any of these common callings is necessarily an outrage upon the liberty of the citizen
....
Id. at 763.
100. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 124 (1889) (upholding a medical licensing requirement
against constitutional challenge).
101. Id.
102. On the political background of the legislation, see generally RONALD M. LABBÉ & JONATHAN LURIE,
THE SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES: REGULATION, RECONSTRUCTION AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2003).
103. Field and Bradley were joined in this project by the jurist and treatise writer Thomas Cooley,
whose influential Treatise on Constitutional Limitations, first published shortly before the ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment, argued that state due process clauses substantively limited the authority
of legislatures to regulate common law property rights. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION
351–61 (1868). After Slaughterhouse, writes legal historian William Forbath, those who felt unjustly
burdened by a particular economic regulation “could proceed to court with Field’s sacred banner of
Free Labor in one hand and Cooley’s Treatise in the other.” Forbath, supra note 96, at 794.
104. In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 106 (N.Y. 1885) (invalidating a state law prohibiting the manufacture
of cigars in certain tenement houses). See also Godcharles v. Wigeman, 6 A. 354, 356 (Pa. 1886) (striking
down a state law requiring that iron workers be paid in cash at regular intervals as an unconstitutional
attempt to “prevent persons who are sui juris from making their own contracts” that was “not only
degrading to his manhood, but subversive of his rights as a citizen of the United States”); State v.
Goodwill, 10 S.E. 285, 286 (W. Va. 1889) (striking down a state law forbidding payment in company
script on the ground that it interfered with the “liberty” of every man “to pursue any lawful trade or
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Supreme Court, in dicta, attached the New York court’s precise formulation to the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, adding that a person must also
be free “to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential”
to securing such liberties.105 The doctrinal stage for constitutional “liberty of
contract” was set.
Opening night, of course, came a decade later, in Lochner v. New York, when
the Supreme Court struck down a maximum hours law for bakers on the ground
that it violated one’s “right to make a contract in relation to his business,” including
his “right to purchase and sell labor.” 106 Justice Rufus Peckham’s majority opinion
incorporates elements of the familiar common law injunction against special
legislative privileges alongside a recognizably modern fundamental rights analysis.
This hybrid quality has made the opinion famously resistant to simple
characterization, and has provided generations of historians and legal scholars with
a fertile subject of interpretation and debate.
Before turning to Peckham’s opinion itself, it is helpful to situate Lochner in its
historical context. In the half-century following the end of the Civil War, Americans
experienced a remarkable revolution in their social and economic order, as their
traditional (if highly idealized) republic of independent farmers and artisans was
transformed into an industrial society characterized by large corporate employers,
the proliferation of low-skill occupations, and an intensely competitive wage
system. To many contemporaries, this industrial reorganization of American life
and labor subverted prevailing ideals of economic freedom and independence—
hotly contested concepts in the post-Civil War era, but ones that required, at the
very least, a meaningful measure of autonomy in individual decision-making. In
response, wage workers and their allies in progressive reform movements
prevailed on state legislatures to ensure certain basic guarantees and protections
for workers, such as requiring payment of wages in cash and at regular intervals,
and establishing minimum wages and maximum hours.107 Such demands for
“special protection from the coercive effects of a corporate industrial economy,”
Gillman writes, “constituted a direct challenge to an established tenet of political
legitimacy”—the principal of state neutrality. 108 As I discussed in Part I, that
neutrality principle was embodied in the constitutive terms of the police power—
specifically, the requirement that regulatory interference with individual liberty or
property serve the public good and general welfare, rather than the “partial”
interests of a favored class.
Justice Peckham’s majority opinion reflects this tension. Peckham wasted little
time in announcing that a man’s “right to make a contract in relation to his

avocation” (quoting People v. Gillson, 109 N.Y. 389, 399 (N.Y. 1888))). See generally Lindsay, supra 24,
at 73 & nn. 95–100.
105. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
106. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
107. See GILLMAN, supra note 97, at 14; Lindsay, supra note 80, at 715.
108. GILLMAN, supra note 97, at 14.
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business” included “[t]he right to purchase or to sell labor.”109 Although the
challenged hours regulation “necessarily interfere[d] with” that right, that was not
the end of the matter. 110 There existed “certain powers . . . somewhat vaguely
termed police powers,” Peckham explained, that inhered “in the sovereignty of
each State,” and with which “the 14th Amendment was not designed to
interfere.”111 “Both [the] property and liberty” protected were thus “held on such
reasonable conditions as may be imposed by the . . . State in the exercise of those
powers.”112 Foremost among those conditions was the requirement that police
regulations serve “the safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the public,”
rather than the partial interests of a particular class. 113
Up to this point, Peckham’s analysis carries distinct echoes of the commonlaw (and Jacksonian) prohibition against special legislative privileges that Justices
Field and Bradley read into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities
Clause. In this respect, the new due process right to “liberty of contract” delimited
state authority not by establishing a bastion of private economic prerogative that
the legislature could not breach, but rather by enabling the federal courts, for the
first time, to enforce conditions on the exercise of state regulatory authority that
were intrinsic to the police power itself. As Peckham put it, if the federal courts
could not enforce limits on state regulation, the “14th Amendment would have no
efficacy and the legislatures of the States would have unbounded power, and it
would be enough to say that any piece of legislation was enacted to conserve the
morals, the health or the safety of the people.” 114 If courts deferred to every
legislative assertion of public purpose, “no matter how absolutely without
foundation . . . [t]he claim of the police power would be a mere pretext,—[and]
become another and [a] delusive name for the supreme sovereignty of the state to
be exercised free from constitutional constraint.” 115 Rather, the Fourteenth
Amendment had made it the business of the federal courts to scrutinize the police
rationale proffered by a state legislature, and ensure that the claims of public
purpose were more than “mere pretext.”116 “In every case that comes before this
court . . . where legislation of this character is concerned and where the protection
of the Federal Constitution is sought,” Peckham continued, “the question
necessarily arises: Is this a fair, reasonable and appropriate exercise of the police
power of the state, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference
with the right of the individual to his personal liberty . . . ?” 117

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Yet the due process right to liberty of contract did more than authorize the
federal courts to enforce familiar common law limits on state police authority.
Because the state’s effort to intercede in the terms of employment now registered
constitutionally, it triggered a much more exacting review of the legislative
rationale than pre-Civil War state common law courts would have recognized.
“[B]efore an act can be held to be valid which interferes with the general right of
an individual to be free in his person and in his power to contract in relation to his
own labor,” Peckham explained, the regulation “must have a more direct relation,
as a means to an end, and the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate.” 118
This approach comports with Epstein’s classical liberal position. That position,
Epstein explains, endorses “a broad reading of liberty under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment,” 119 covering a host of “economic, expressive, or
intimate” 120 interests, and “gives narrow weight to purported justifications both as
to the ends the state chooses and the means it uses to achieve them.”121
In Lochner, Justice Peckham considered two possible legislative ends. The first,
whether the act was “valid as a labor law, pure and simple,” could “be dismissed in
a few words,” Peckham declared.122 Because “bakers as a class are . . . equal in
intelligence and capacity to men in other trades or manual occupations, [and thus]
. . . able to assert their rights and care for themselves without the protecting arm
of the state,” he reasoned, “the interest of the public is not in the slightest degree
affected” by a law “interfering with their independence of judgment and of
action.” 123 Viewed as a “labor law,” the regulation was naked class legislation.
Peckham then turned to the second proffered legislative end—that the law
protected “the health of the individual engaged in the occupation of a baker.” 124
Peckham acknowledged that, in light of the voluminous “statistics regarding all
trades and occupations” introduced in the case, “the trade of a baker does not
appear to be as healthy as some other trades.”125 In the pre-Lochner era marked by
judicial deference toward a state’s regulatory rationale, such a finding would have
supplied an ample factual basis to uphold the law as a valid health regulation.
Indeed, earlier in his opinion Peckham noted that judicial scrutiny of state police
regulations traditionally had “been guided by rules of a very liberal nature.” 126 But
because the challenged hours regulation implicated “the right of free contract on
the part of the individual,” the Court required greater congruence between
118. Id. at 57–58.
119. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 338.
120. Id. at 305.
121. Id. at 310.
122. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 57. The hours regulation “does not affect any other portion of the public than those who
are engaged in that occupation,” Peckham explained, for “[c]lean and wholesome bread does not
depend upon whether the baker works but ten hours per day or sixty hours a week.” Id.
125. Id. at 59.
126. Id. at 54.
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legislative ends and means.127 As Peckham explained, “[t]here must be more than
the . . . possible existence of some small amount of unhealthiness to warrant
legislative interference with liberty.” 128 Because baking was not distinctly more
dangerous than many other common trades, Peckham concluded, it was not
“unhealthy . . . to that degree which would authorize the legislature to interfere
with the right to labor.” 129
Peckham, like Epstein, also understood heightened judicial scrutiny of
economic regulations as a bulwark against the ominous expansion of the state
police power generally. Peckham noted the recent increase in legislative
“interference . . . with the ordinary trades and occupations of the people,” and
approvingly cited a series of state court decisions striking down such regulations as
unconstitutional deprivations of individual liberty and property. 130 If the State of
New York could abridge “the right of an individual, sui juris,” to contract for the sale
of his labor, “there would seem to be no length to which legislation of this nature
might not go.”131 “No trade, no occupation, no mode of earning one’s living, could
escape this all-pervading power,”132 he cautioned. As a result, the state “would
assume the position of a supervisor, or pater familias, over every act of the
individual, and its right of governmental interference with his hours of labor, his
hours of exercise, the character thereof, and the extent to which it shall be carried
would be recognized and upheld.” 133 At stake for the majority was not only the
principle of governmental neutrality, or even freedom of contract, but the
sovereignty of the individual in relation to the authority of the state.
In short, we might identify two distinct but interrelated principles at play in
Lochner: the traditional common law requirement that police regulations serve the
general interest (i.e., the “state neutrality” principle) and the defense of individual
prerogative, economic or otherwise, against state interference (i.e., the “individual
127. Id. at 59.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 63.
131. Id. at 58.
132. Id. at 59. “A printer, a tinsmith, a locksmith, a carpenter, a cabinetmaker, a dry goods clerk, a
bank’s, a lawyer’s or a physician’s clerk, or a clerk in almost any kind of business, would all come under
the power of the legislature,” Peckham continued. Id. If the Court were to endorse “the interest of the
state that its population should be strong and robust,” and thereby sanction as a valid health law “any
legislation which may be said to tend to make people healthy,” all manner of human conduct “would
come under the restrictive sway of the legislature.” Id. at 60. By way of illustration, Peckham described
a parade of horribles running more than a page in length. Under the government’s theory, he declared:
Not only the hours of employees, but the hours of employers, could be regulated, and
doctors, lawyers, scientists, all professional men, as well as athletes and artisans, could be
forbidden to fatigue their brains and bodies by prolonged hours of exercise, lest the
fighting strength of the state be impaired.
Id. at 60–61. “We mention these extreme cases,” Peckham explained, “because the contention is
extreme.” Id. at 61.
133. Id. at 62.
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sovereignty” principle). 134 In Lochner, these two principles operate hand-in-hand:
The state’s abridgement of Joseph Lochner’s liberty triggered heightened scrutiny
of the legislative rationale, which was found wanting precisely because the
legislature had improperly favored “bakers as a class.”135 In the majority’s view, one
highly salutary effect of that decision (though not its formal stated basis) was to
limit the scope of state authority at a time of significant regulatory expansion. The
two principles are nevertheless conceptually distinct, and need not travel in
tandem. For example, one who neither sanctifies individual economic prerogatives
per se, nor worries about the size of government generally, can still believe that
courts should guard vigilantly against legislative favoritism—a position that is
theoretically compatible with big, active government. Conversely, one can believe,
as Epstein does, that courts should maximize individual economic prerogative by
subjecting every state encroachment, “partial” and “general” alike, to exacting
scrutiny. Under this view, a breach of the state neutrality principle is sufficient but
not necessary to trigger heightened scrutiny.
Scholars disagree about which of these two principles—state neutrality or
individual sovereignty—predominates in Lochner.136 And as we have seen,
Peckham’s opinion does indeed offer support for both readings. At the very least,
Peckham melded a neo-Jacksonian objection to class legislation with “[t]he laissezfaire concept of liberty [that was then] the common currency among the elite in
the United States.”137 Yet the difficulty of pointing to Lochner’s “true” meaning is
due also to the decision’s pivotal position in the Court’s highly contested, decadeslong transition between two historical modes of protecting individual liberty. As I
134. Legal historian G. Edward White similarly describes two distinct but often intermingled strains of
American political economy and legal/constitutional thought that came to bear on the Court’s Lochner-era
police powers jurisprudence, which he labels, respectively, the “anti-class principle” and the “public/private
distinction.” White concludes, as do I, that the “analytical lynchpin” of Lochner for all of the Justices except
Holmes was not “liberty of contract” per se, but “the anticlass principle informed by the heritage of ‘free
labor’ theory.” White, supra note 83, at 101.
135. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905).
136. For example, Professor David E. Bernstein argues that the Court’s analysis in Lochner turns
“on individual liberty rights rather than hostility to class legislation.” BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 33–34.
He acknowledges that the “class legislation” theme informed the Court’s review of labor legislation, but
concludes that some Lochner revisionists have overstated the importance of the “state neutrality”
principle, which, he maintains, was “barely evident in Peckham’s majority opinion.” Id. at 33. Rather,
Bernstein asserts that Peckham’s opinion focused primarily “on the right to liberty of contract, and
relegated the more equalitarian concerns” rooted in the principle of state neutrality “to an oblique
aside.” Id. at 16. In my view, the balance of evidence runs against Bernstein’s reading. First, Peckham
framed the basic question before the Court in terms of traditional police power categories: “Is this a
fair, reasonable, and appropriate exercise of the police power of the state, or is it an unreasonable,
unnecessary, and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty . . . ?”
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905). Moreover, contemporary commentary on Lochner was
dominated by discussion of the anti-class principle. The fact is that the New York bakery law was a labor
law, “pure and simple,” as everyone understood. The question that preoccupied contemporaries was
precisely whether a labor law intended by the legislature to mitigate laborers’ disadvantage in the
bargaining process might nevertheless serve the general welfare. See White, supra note 83, at 104–05.
137. Benedict, supra note 22, at 313.
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discussed in Part I, for most of the 19th century, individual rights were viewed as
“specific immunities” from state authority—in Gillman’s helpful formulation, the
sphere of individual prerogative that was “left over after [the] government ha[d]
reached the limits of its authorized power.”138 During the late-19th and early 20th
centuries, in response to the era’s broad expansion of state economic regulation,
the Court gradually relinquished the traditional “limited powers-residual
freedoms” model in favor of a “general powers-preferred freedoms” model that
essentially conceded the plenary nature of much state and federal regulatory
authority while “extend[ing] special protections to particularly important rights and
liberties.”139
Consider Lochner in this light. For many legislators, labor spokesmen, and
reformers, laws such as New York’s maximum hours provision merely provided
wage workers with modest protection against the depredations of the industrial
economy. For such advocates of regulation, prohibiting bakers from working more
than ten hours per day or 60 hours per week was surely no more an encroachment
on individual economic prerogatives than, for example, prohibiting a farmer from
selling produce outside of a specific location defined by ordinance. Yet for other
contemporaries, state interference in the terms of employment posed a novel
challenge to the principle of state neutrality as they understood it. As heirs to the
long-standing common law prohibition on special legislative privileges, Lochner-era
judges perceived their critical duty to be that of distinguishing between the vast
majority of state police regulations that were legitimately directed toward the
public health and welfare, and the illegitimate minority that were intended to serve
the interests of a narrow class. Judges reared on a pre-industrial understanding of
state neutrality—and perhaps influenced, as well, by laissez-faire ideas then in
circulation—presumed that contractual exchange functioned as a neutral arbiter
of the parties’ economic preferences; accordingly, they viewed some efforts to
curb exploitative labor practices as legislative favoritism. As a result, even courts
that routinely upheld all variety of economic regulations could condemn as
illegitimate “class legislation” reform initiatives directed toward mitigating the
inequality of bargaining power between employers and employees. Limiting state
regulatory authority to matters of the public health and general welfare was not
new in principle; in practice, however, direct legislative interference with the
specific terms of employment tested those limits in a new way.140
Viewed in this context, the Lochner Court struck down New York’s maximum
hours law because five justices were not persuaded that limiting the number of
hours worked by bakers meaningfully served the general welfare or public health.
Because the statute thus transgressed the constitutive terms of the police power,
138. Gillman, supra note 39, at 625.
139. Id. at 640, 643.
140. For an insightful discussion of the now-sizeable body of revisionist historical scholarship
characterizing Lochner-era police powers jurisprudence as a clash between traditional police powers
categories and “[t]he development of class conflict in an increasingly industrial society.” See Rowe,
supra note 80, at 232.
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the legislature had exceeded its authority. In this respect, however, the handful of
labor-regulation cases headlined by Lochner were distinct outliers.141 Throughout
this period, federal and state courts upheld the vast majority of police regulations
against constitutional challenge. Two empirical studies published at the height of
the Lochner era by the legal historian Charles Warren provide striking evidence. 142
Warren set out to test the common “progressive” complaint that the Supreme
Court had fallen out of step “with modern conditions,” frustrating the ability of
state legislatures to exercise their police authority “in the interest of the general
public welfare.”143 To do so, he reviewed all 560 U.S. Supreme Court cases decided
between 1887 and 1911 in which petitioners challenged the constitutionality of a
“social or economic” regulation. Warren reported that of those 560, the Court
struck down only three (including the New York law challenged in Lochner).144 “The
actual record of the Court,” he concluded, “thus shows how little chance a litigant
has of inducing the Court to restrict the police power of a State, or to overthrow
State laws under the ‘due process’ clause; in other words, it shows the Court to be
a bulwark to the State police power, not a destroyer.”145 Modern scholars confirm
Warren’s assessment.146 Indeed, contrary to the modern denomination of the
period between 1905 and 1937 as the “Locnher era,” social and economic
regulation exploded in the early 20th century, as a “new forcefulness and
resourcefulness crept into discussions of the police power.” 147 In short, the select
cast of iconic Lochner-era cases that Epstein holds up as emblems of classical liberal
constitutionalism were the exception rather than the rule.
Although courts were most suspicious of governmental intermeddling in labor
relations, the justices nevertheless were prepared to uphold regulations that
141. In addition to the Court’s later decisions striking down minimum wage statues, see infra notes
146–158 and accompanying text, Lochner’s “progeny” includes two decisions striking down on “liberty
of contract” grounds state and federal laws protecting collective bargaining. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236
U.S. 1, 26 (1915)(striking down Kansas statute prohibiting employers from requiring employees, as a
condition of employment, to agree not to join a labor union); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 171,
180 (1908)(striking down the federal Erdman Act of 1898, making it a criminal offense to refuse to hire
or to discharge a worker because of membership in a labor union).
142. Charles Warren, A Bulwark to the State Police Power—The United States Supreme Court, 13
COLUM. L. REV. 667 (1913) [hereinafter Warren, Bulwark]; Charles Warren, The Progressiveness of the
United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 294 (1913) [hereinafter Warren, Progressiveness].
143. Warren, Bulwark, supra note 142, at 667.
144. Warren, Progressiveness, supra note 142, at 295.
145. Id. at 310.
146. See, e.g., Benedict, supra note 22, at 297; William E. Forbath, Politics, State-Building, and the Courts, 1870–
1920, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 643, 645 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008);
Gillman, supra note 39, at 634; Novak, supra note 22, at 273. As the political scientist Karren Orren writes, “many reform
landmarks of Progressive lawmaking—railroad regulation, antitrust statutes, protective food and drug statutes, industrial
accident statutes, and others—survived judicial scrutiny at state and federal levels . . . Neither repudiated nor significantly
weakened, these programs carried on as bulwarks of the American welfare state for the next half-century.” Karen Orren,
The Laws of Industrial Organization, 1870–1920, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAWIN AMERICA531, 532 (Michael Grossberg
& Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008).
147. Novak, supra note 22, at 269.
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directly abridged the contractual freedom of employers and employees when they
were persuaded that the interference with liberty served the public health or
welfare.148 In Holden v. Hardy, for example, decided barely a year after the Court
first recognized a man’s due process right “to earn his livelihood by any lawful
calling[, and] to pursue any livelihood or avocation,”149 seven justices agreed that
in industries where employers “and their operatives do not stand upon an
equality,” the legislature “may properly interpose its authority.” In such
circumstances, the Court explained, “the proprietors lay down the rules, and the
laborers are practically constrained to obey them.”150 Even when “both parties are
of full age, and competent to contract,” the public retains an interest in the welfare
of the employee, who, the legislature may reasonably judge, needs to “be
protected against himself.” 151 The Court then concluded, in language that both
recalls the public welfare rationale of antebellum police power cases and
anticipates the “public right” to regulate of the New Deal cases, “[t]he whole is no
greater than the sum of all the parts, and when the individual health, safety, and
welfare are sacrificed or neglected, the state must suffer.” 152
This is not to deny that the Court’s Lochner-era police powers jurisprudence
endorsed classical liberal themes. Some of it certainly did. Indeed, the apogee of
constitutional economic liberty came not in Lochner itself, but two decades later in
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, when a five-justice majority struck down a federal
statute establishing a minimum wage for women in Washington, D.C. 153 In Adkins,
the constitutional right to “liberty of contract” ripened into a more pointed
injunction against governmental interference in the private labor market. The
majority opinion omits Lochner’s broad reflection on the scope of the police power;
instead, the constitutional right itself takes center stage, and does most of the
analytical work. “[F]reedom of contract is . . . the general rule,” Justice Sutherland
explained, “and restraint the exception, and the exercise of legislative authority to
abridge it can be justified only by . . . exceptional circumstances.”154 With regard to

148.

On the court’s relative assertiveness with respect to labor regulations, Orren writes:

[D]uring the period from 1870 to 1920, American judges administered one set of rules . . .
when the subject matter of the dispute before them was . . . production and trade of goods
and money [,] and another set when the subject matter . . . was . . . relations between
master and servant and employees’ collective action.
Orren, supra note 146, at 533.
149. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 598 (1897).
150. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 397 (1898) (upholding a Utah law limiting the hours of labor
for miners and smelters).
151. Id.
152. Id.; see also Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917) (upholding an Oregon law limiting the
hours of labor for women and men to ten hours per day, and requiring employers to pay time-and-ahalf wages for up to three overtime hours per day); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding
an Oregon law limiting the hours of labor for women to ten hours per day).
153. Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
154. Id. at 546.
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the challenged minimum wage law, such circumstances were wholly lacking. The
law was “simply and exclusively a price-fixing law,” Sutherland declared, because it
prevented individuals from “freely contract[ing] with one another in respect to the
price for which one shall render service to the other in a purely private employment
where both are willing, perhaps anxious, to agree.”155 When the government fixes
a wage according to the minimum needs of the employee rather than the market
value of the services provided, “it amounts to a compulsory exaction from the
employer” of “an arbitrary payment . . . having no causal connection with his
business, or the contract of the work the employee engages to do.”156 This
compelled disbursement, divorced from a market-driven notion of value, rendered
the statute “a naked, arbitrary exercise of power,”157 and thus “put[] upon it the
stamp of invalidity.” 158
Sutherland’s insistence that governmental interference with individual
prerogatives, economic or otherwise, was appropriately subject to exacting
scrutiny well serves the “universal ideal” at the center of Epstein’s classical liberal
vision—that outside of a few exceptional and very narrow circumstances, “the
terms of [a] contract [be] left to the parties to devise.”159 Yet a mere 14 years later,
in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, the Court overturned Adkins and brought the
Lochner era to a decisive end. 160 Henceforth, legislative interference with the terms
of contract would be upheld so long as the regulation was “reasonable in relation
to its subject and [was] adopted in the interests of the community.” 161 In Epstein’s
telling, Parrish and its federal power counterpart, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel,
inaugurated a “progressive counterrevolution” that “vanquished” a century-and-a155. Id. at 555.
156. Id. at 557–58.
157. Id. at 559.
158. Id. at 558. Twelve years later, in Morehead v. New York, 298 U.S. 587 (1936), overruled in part
by Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. W. Reference & Bond Ass’n, 313 U.S. 236 (1941), the Court relied entirely
on Adkins to strike down a New York law prohibiting the payment of “oppressive and unreasonable”
wages. The Act’s fatal flaw, according to the Court—the feature that rendered it an unconstitutional
deprivation of economic liberty—was the legislature’s definition of “oppressive and unreasonable” to
include wages that were “less than sufficient to meet the minimum cost of living necessary to health.”
Id. at 605 (quoting N.Y Labor Law § 551(7) (1933)). As in Adkins, to fix a wage through any means but
private bargaining rendered the wage an “arbitrary” “exaction,” and thus a form of economic
compulsion in conflict with constitutional economic liberty.
159. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 338.
160. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
161. Id. at 391. The only thing the Court had to decide, Hughes explained, was that a challenged
economic regulation—in Parrish, a statutory minimum wage for women—was not an “arbitrary and
capricious” means of protecting workers from “the most injurious competition” in the labor market. Id.
at 399. “[I]f the protection of women is a legitimate end of the exercise of state power,” the Court
queried, “how can it be said that the requirement of the payment of a minimum wage fairly fixed in
order to meet the very necessities of existence is not an admissible means to that end?” Id. at 398.
Thenceforth, the Court explained the following year, “regulatory legislation affecting ordinary
commercial transactions” would be upheld unless the available facts “preclude the assumption that it
rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.” United States
v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
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half of limited government and constitutional economic liberty, setting American
constitutionalism along an epochal, deeply misguided detour from its original
classical liberal course.162 Epstein is correct, of course, to view the New Deal as an
important turning point for the constitutional review of economic regulation, both
state and federal. Yet as Part I demonstrated, Parrish and its lineage of “rational
basis” decisions did not invent the presumption of validity for economic
regulations.163
Rather, the Parrish Court revived the presumption of validity with which
common law courts approached police regulations throughout the 19th century,
and which the Lochner-era Court had (equivocally and discretely) unsettled three
decades earlier. Chief Justice Hughes’ majority opinion bears close attention. Elsie
Parrish, a chambermaid at the West Coast Hotel, had sued her employer to recover
$216.19—the difference between the wages paid to her and the minimum wage
fixed by Washington State. 164 The Hotel challenged the statutory minimum wage
on the basis of Adkins, arguing that it unconstitutionally deprived employers and
employees alike of “freedom of contract.” 165 Hughes retorted:
What is this freedom? The Constitution does not speak of freedom of
contract. It speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty
without due process of law. In prohibiting that deprivation, the
162.

EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 34. With regard to rights of liberty and property, Epstein writes:

Historically, the magnitude of the shift in political and constitutional orientation between
the (largely) classical liberal and the (largely) progressive view is captured in one critical
flip-flop. Roughly speaking, economic liberties, and to a lesser extent property rights,
received strong protection in the pre-1937 era and far weaker protection thereafter.
Id. at 337.
Although it is does not bear directly on either Epstein’s thesis or my critique, it is worth noting
for the sake of precision that the Court arguably disavowed the “absolute and uncontrollable liberty” of
Adkins three years before the constitutional “revolution” of 1937. In Nebbia v. New York, the Court
rejected a substantive due process challenge to a New York State statute fixing the price of milk. Nebbia
v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934). The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, the Court explained, “do not prohibit governmental regulation for the public welfare,”
but merely require “that the end shall be accomplished by methods consistent with due process.” Id.
“And the guaranty of due process . . . demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought
to be attained.” Id. Accordingly, revisionist scholars have challenged the dating of the New Deal
“revolution.” Professor Barry Cushman persuasively argues that the watershed moment in the New Deal
constitutional revolution came not in 1937, but three years earlier, in Nebbia, when the Court
abandoned the long-standing distinction between businesses “affected with a public interest,” over
which the states and Congress traditionally enjoyed broad regulatory authority under their police and
commerce powers, respectively, and “private” businesses, which were buffered against governmental
intervention. BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION 154–55 (1998). By the time the Court decided Parrish, Cushman argues, it thus had already
discarded an essential premise of economic substantive due process—the notion that only a discrete
class of public and quasi-public enterprises were susceptible to wage and price regulations. Id.
163. See generally Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Caroline Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144.
164. Parrish, 300 U.S. at 388.
165. Id.
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Constitution does not recognize an absolute and uncontrollable
liberty. . . . [T]he liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social organization
which requires the protection of law against the evils which menace the
health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people. 166
Parrish not only spurned constitutional liberty of contract, however. Hughes’
opinion also took “judicial notice” of what had become “common knowledge
through the length and breadth of the land”—that the economic well-being of
individuals was integral to the “public interest.”167 “What can be closer to the public
interest,” Hughes queried, “than the health of women and their protection from
unscrupulous and overreaching employers?”168 Indeed, “recent economic
experience” had brought the very public implications of putatively “private”
economic hardship “into a strong light”:
The exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal position with
respect to bargaining power and are thus relatively defenseless against
the denial of a living wage is not only detrimental to their health and well
being, but casts a direct burden for their support upon the community.
What these workers lose in wages the taxpayers are called upon to pay.
The bare cost of living must be met . . . . The community is not bound to
provide what is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable employers.169
Although reformers, organized laborers, and progressive politicians had long
expounded the connection between individual and public welfare, the sustained
economic crisis of the 1930s had made manifest that interdependence in stark and
undeniable fashion.
Indeed, the Great Depression had exposed as a farce the two classical liberal
presumptions that undergirded Lochner-era constitutional liberty of contract: first,
that the parties to a labor contract “have an equal right to obtain from each other
the best terms they can as the result of private bargaining;” 170 and second, “that
the interest of the public is not in the slightest degree affected by”171 the economic
hardship of individual workers. As long as those presumptions remained intact,
166. Id. at 391.
167. Id. at 399.
168. Id. at 398.
169. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 399 (1937).
170. Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 545 (1923). Epstein’s vision shares that guiding faith.
“[I]n all regimes of private property and freedom of contract,” he writes, “the contract is made to the
very end that each may gain something that he needs or desires more urgently than that which he
proposes to give in exchange.” EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 339–40 (quoting Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1,
17 (1915)). Constitutional review of all economic interventions should thus be guided by “the simple
point that mutual benefits arise from voluntary exchanges no matter how great the initial wealth
differentials may be.” Id. at 340. Accordingly, Epstein dismisses the “progressive” contention that
industrialization altered this timeless truth, which, he asserts, rests on both the misguided equation of
“large firm size with market power,” and the uniquely compulsory quality of state (as compared to
corporate) power. Id. at 41–42, 340.
171. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905).
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legislative intermeddling in workers’ “independence of judgment and of action” 172
could appear “unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary,” 173 and thus a clear
violation of the long-standing state neutrality principle. But in the face of mass
poverty, homelessness, and epidemic levels of unemployment (25% nationally at
the height of the Depression; much higher in some cities and regions)174 that left
throngs of able-bodied men pleading for virtually any paid labor, judicial assertions
of workers’ “equal bargaining power” rang hollow, and statutory labor standards
and/or collective bargaining rights came to look like necessary safeguards rather
than special privileges.
To the extent that the Lochner era does represent a classical liberal moment—
and, as I have argued, that interpretation is equivocal at best—it was not the
belated fulfillment of a worldview woven into the nation’s constitutional fabric
more than a century earlier, but rather a contentious, uncertain, and somewhat
muddled process of regulatory and constitutional adaptation. When Chief Justice
Hughes referred in Parrish to the “liberty in a social organization which requires the
protection of law against the evils which menace the health, safety, morals, and
welfare of the people,” 175 he was neither “rewriting” the Constitution nor
“vanquishing” 150 (or even thirty) years of classical liberal hegemony, as classical
liberal critics of the progressive constitutional turn suppose.176 Rather, Parrish
ushered the police power into the industrial era by rehabilitating the broad
authority to regulate in the public interest that state and local lawmakers had
exercised throughout the 19th century. That rehabilitation, however, required a
renovated understanding of state neutrality, in which public power is not only an
agent of coercion, but also a bulwark against the coercion of economic necessity.
III.

CONCLUSION

Although Richard Epstein disclaims doctrinaire originalism, he nevertheless
stakes his vision of classical liberal constitutionalism to the authority of history—in
particular, to the classical liberal worldview of the late-18th century that the
Founders wove into the constitutional fabric, and that channeled the “historical arc
of legal evolution” right up until the progressive “revolution” of 1937. 177 Indeed,
The Classical Liberal Constitution’s central argument is that the Constitution is not
merely open to classical liberal interpretations, but that it “most emphatically [is] a
classical liberal document”;178 and that fidelity to its true, correct meaning requires
172. Id. at 57. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. Recall that in Lochner, the majority failed
to discern any connection between the challenged hours regulation and “the morals, the health or the
safety of the people.” Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56.
173. Id. at 56–57.
174. See MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA
207 (1986).
175. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392 (1937).
176. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 34; EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 135.
177. Richard A. Epstein, Rediscovering the Classical Liberal Constitution: A Reply to Professor
Hovenkamp, 101 I OWA L. REV. 55, 65 (2015).
178. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 53.
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that we read it as such. The obverse of this position, however, is that if the historical
foundations that Epstein claims for classical liberal constitutionalism turn out to be
unstable or worse, his normative argument collapses, particularly for readers who
do not share his political-philosophical commitments to unregulated markets and
limited government. The other contributors to this forum have very ably
demonstrated that the Constitution was decidedly not classically liberal in its
inception. As Professor Purcell pointedly concludes, to the extent that The Classical
Liberal Constitution purports to be a history of legal and political thought during
the Founding period, it is a history “designed . . . to confer ‘originalist’ legitimacy
and authority on Epstein’s contemporary version of libertarian politics and free
market economics.”179
This Response has argued that Epstein’s narrative of subsequent classical
liberal ascendancy—the “long historical run of about 150 years”180—is likewise
contradicted by the common law vision of public authority and private rights as it
was understood and practiced by lawmakers and courts. Not only did antebellum
states and municipalities routinely regulate a wide variety of economic activity,
intermeddling in myriad ways with ordinary private commercial transaction; to the
extent that courts did enforced limits on the police power, those limits simply were
not drawn, as Epstein claims, according to “the rights of life, liberty, and property
. . . at the core of the natural rights tradition.” 181 The municipal officials, state
legislators, and common law judges who executed the common-law vision of
statecraft during the pre-Civil War decades would not have recognized the proto
“fundamental rights” framework that Epstein anachronistically ascribes to that
period. Further, even the economic liberties jurisprudence of the Lochner era,
which Epstein celebrates as the culmination of the “classical liberal synthesis,”182
was remarkably limited in scope, equivocal in principle, and fleeting in time. In
short, the actual history of economic regulation in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, and the relatively modest limits that courts placed on such
regulation, offer meager evidence of a classical liberal constitutional tradition.

179. Purcell, supra note 11, at 121; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 40–47; Olken, supra
note 12, at 102–104.
180. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
181. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 13.
182. Id. at 339.

